Michael Murez

Publications

In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann, Andrea Onofri (eds.) « The Fragmented Mind »

Belief Fragments and Mental Files

Oxford University Press, 2021.
Michael Murez
Abstract : Belief fragments and mental files are based on the same idea : that information in people’s minds is compartmentalized rather than lumped all together. While some authors (Cherniak 1986 ; Egan 2008) occasionally describe fragments as ‘mental files,’ philosophers mostly use the two notions differently, though the exact relationship between fragments and files has yet to be examined in detail. This chapter has three main goals. The first is to argue that fragments and files, properly (...)

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In J. Smortchkova, K. Dołęga, & Tobias Schlicht (eds.) « What Are Mental Representations ? » Oxford University Press, 2020.

Representational Kinds

avec J. Smortchkova
Michael Murez
Abstract : Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting kind of kind is : kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific (...)

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Klesis 47, 2020

Putnam et McDowell sur les objets de l’introspection

In H. Wagner (ed.) « Lectures de Hilary Putnam »
Michael Murez
https://www.revue-klesis.org/pdf/kl...

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In. R. Goodman, J. Genone & N. Kroll (eds.) « Singular Thought and Mental Files », Oxford University Press, 2020.

The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought : A Psychological Perspective

avec Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland
Michael Murez
Abstract : We argue that the most ambitious version of the mental files theory of singular thought, according to which mental files are a wide-ranging psychological natural kind underlying all and only singular thinking, is unsupported by the available psychological data. Nevertheless, critical examination of the theory from a psychological perspective opens up promising avenues for research, especially concerning the relationship between our perceptual capacity to individuate and track (...)

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Les Études philosophiques 2019/3 (N°193)

Le fressellianisme face au dilemme de l’accointance

In S. Gandon & D. Perrin (eds.) « Renouveaux de la notion russellienne d’acquaintance »
Michael Murez
Selon le russellianisme, nous avons des pensées singulières faisant directement référence aux objets, fondées sur des relations d’accointance (1^re partie). Selon le frégéanisme, toute pensée est médiatisée par un concept (2^e partie). Le fressellianisme anti-descriptiviste cherche à réconcilier ces thèses apparemment opposées, et à éviter les objections auxquelles chacune s’expose, en postulant des concepts singuliers, individués par des relations d’accointance (3^e partie). Mais le fressellianisme rencontre (...)

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Articles ou chapitres publiés dans des ouvrages collectifs

In J. Smortchkova, K. Dołęga, & Tobias Schlicht (eds.) « What Are Mental Representations ? » Oxford University Press, 2020.

Representational Kinds

avec J. Smortchkova
Michael Murez
In. R. Goodman, J. Genone & N. Kroll (eds.) « Singular Thought and Mental Files », Oxford University Press, 2020.

The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought : A Psychological Perspective

avec Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland
Michael Murez