A Sense of Free Will – The Phenomenology of Free Will and its Epistemological Significance

A Sense of Free Will – The Phenomenology of Free Will and its Epistemological Significance

Argument

Intuitions about free will are linked and in part based on the way it is like for an agent to act – on our common agentive phenomenology. This observation leads naturally to the question about the content of our experience when we experience ourselves as acting freely. Is the content of the experience of acting freely compatible with determinism? Do we have an experience of an open future such that we can choose one out of several alternatives? Do we experience ourselves as agent-causes? Various philosophical and empirical methods have been used to address these issues and the related epistemological questions: Are we justified in believing that these experiences are veridical or do we have reason to think that the relevant experiences are mere illusions? In what way does our experience ground a substantial view of ourselves?

The aim of the workshop is to discuss these questions about the content of agentive phenomenology and related epistemological issues and to examine the way in which they bear on the question of moral responsibility.

Schedule

Sunday, 16.6.13, Gutenberg-Museum, Saal Gemperlin:

15:00 – 16:15 – Timothy O’Connor

16:30 – 17:45 – Richard Swinburne

Monday, 17.6.13 Miséricorde, Room 2122 A+B:

9:45 – 11:00 – Tim Bayne

11:15 – 12:30 – Nicole Vincent

14:30 – 15:45 – Sven Walter

16:00 – 17:15 – Jean-Baptiste Guillon

Tuesday, 18.6.13 Miséricorde, Room 2122 A+B:

9:45 – 11:00 – Terence Horgan

11:15 – 12:30 – Emmanuel Baierlé

14:30 – 15:45 – Oisin Deery

16:00 – 17:15 – Eddy Nahmias

Wednesday, 19.6.13 Miséricorde, Room 2122 A+B:

9:45 – 11:00 – Martine Nida-Rümelin

11:15 – 12:30 – Cyrille Michon

14:30 – 15:45 – Derk Pereboom

Colloque organisé par Cyrille Michon, Emmanuel Baierlé, Jean-Baptiste Guillon, Martine Nida-Rümelin.



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